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Abstract 
There are several economic reasons why investors might want to hedge 
local risk resulting from relative wealth concerns; namely, keeping up with 
the Joneses preferences and competition for local assets in short supply. In 
equilibrium, hedging for these purposes results in a negative risk Premium 
for the local risk factors. We study the empirical implications of this 
equilibrium at the level of the nine US census divisions. As a proxy for the 
local risk factor we use regional labor income growth. In explaining the 
cross-section of stock returns, the model performs substantially better than 
the CAPM, and as well as the Fama-French three factor model. For small 
and growth stocks our model outperforms the three factor model. JEL 




Key words  
Relative wealth concerns, local risk, negative risk premium. 
 
 
* The usual caveat applies 
Juan Pedro Gómez 
IE Business School 
Castellón de la Plana 8 
28006 – Madrid, Spain 
juanp.gomez@ie.edu 
Richard Priestley 
Dept. of Financial Economics 




Marshal School of Business, USC 
fzapatero@marshall.usc.edu 

















We study and test the cross section implications of relative wealth concerns. There are two cases (not
necessarily exclusive) suggested in the literature, in which relative wealth concerns can result in non-
diversi¯able local risk factors. First, if agents display \external habit formation" (EHF) and some agents
face some type of market friction, as shown in G¶ omez, Priestley and Zapatero (2007) then relative wealth
concerns will arise. EHF means that the individuals care about their wealth in relation to that of their
neighbors in their optimal allocation decision. As a result of this, investors \keep up with the Joneses:"
they bias their portfolio towards securities which are correlated with the wealth of their peers. These
types of preferences are studied in Abel (1990) and Gal¶ ³ (1994). In equilibrium, if some investors face
some market friction, (like a non-diversi¯able source of income), securities that are correlated with the
idiosyncratic component of local wealth (as opposed to the market portfolio) will have a negative risk
premium in the local factor, since investors are willing to give up expected return in order not to distance
themselves from their peers' wealth.
The second way in which relative wealth concerns arise is developed in DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer
(2004). The idea is that individuals with standard preferences might care about the wealth of their peers
because competition for non-diversi¯able assets in limited supply drives their price up; if investors cannot
compete in wealth with their peers they might be left out of the market. This, under certain conditions,
will bias investors' portfolios towards those assets positively correlated with the local, non-diversi¯able
risk. In equilibrium, investors will pay a premium for those assets.
In this paper we study whether there exists evidence in favor of local risk-hedging at the domestic
level within the US. As noted above, in equilibrium, portfolio externalities imply a negative risk premium
for those securities positively correlated with the undiversi¯ed wealth of the peer group members. In
particular, as peer groups, we consider the nine US census divisions for the US.1 As a proxy for undiver-
si¯ed local wealth we use divisional labor income. We split all US public stocks across the nine divisions,
depending on the location of the headquarters of the ¯rms. Consistent with the model predictions, we
¯nd a statistically signi¯cant and sizeable negative risk premium associated with the proxy for local un-
diversi¯able wealth. In terms of the average cross sectional R
2 and pricing errors, the model performs
substantially better than the CAPM and as well as the Fama and French (1993) three factor model when
we consider all stocks. When we focus on small stocks and low book to market stocks, arguably more
local that large stocks and value stocks, we ¯nd the model performs substantially better than the Fama
and French (1993) three factor model.
Our paper is complimentary to the analysis of G¶ omez, Priestley and Zapatero (2007). They ¯nd
evidence in favor of portfolio externalities at the international level on portfolios of US, UK, German
and Japanese stocks. For all countries, prices of (mainly domestic) securities that help hedging the
country-speci¯c labor risk have a negative risk premium which agents willingly accept.
Focusing on divisional, rather than international portfolio choices, poses certain advantages and new
challenges. First, unlike in an international setting, the purely domestic problem is free of a number of
\usual suspects" for portfolio biases. Arguably, explicit (like regulation, taxes, ¯nancial or human capital
1We include a map of the nine US census divisions in Figure 1 as an appendix.
1controls) or tacit (like information, language or culture) barriers cannot be invoked as a convincing
explanation for domestic portfolio externalities. Second, additional risk sources, like exchange risk or
country-speci¯c political risk, disappear.
At the same time, in a domestic setting, new potentially relevant factors arise like, for instance,
population density. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) ¯nd that prices of stocks in census divisions with high
population density have, holding all else equal, signi¯cantly higher prices than shares in low population
density divisions, although in their framework the calculated e®ect this has on expected returns is very
small. Their explanation is similar to the short-supply argument in DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004):
low population density is strongly associated with low aggregate book value; shortage of local ¯rms
pushes their prices up driving returns down. More importantly, lower density is probably associated not
only with fewer ¯rms but, also, smaller ¯rms. It is well documented (see, for instance, Brown and Medo®
(1989) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998)) that smaller ¯rms pay, other things equal, lower wages making
them, in principle, less competitive in attracting workers from other divisions. In other words, ¯rms in
lower density divisions are more likely to be highly correlated with the local, non diversi¯able labor risk.
Investors, searching to hedge their exposure to this income risk, will pay a higher price for local ¯rm
shares. Thus, the negative premium will tend to be higher (in absolute value) in divisions with lower
population density. Our tests capture this e®ect: the (absolute value) size of the negative premium is up
to two times higher in lower population density divisions, like West North Central, West South Central,
East South Central, and East North Central.2 The di®erences in the estimated prices of risk for the low
population density divisions and the high population density divisions are statistically signi¯cant.
To explore further the \locality" of small ¯rms, we sort portfolios within each division into two subsets
by market capitalization: small and large. For each division, the twenty size-sorted portfolios are sorted
into two groups of ten, the ¯rst group are ¯rms with the lower market capitalization. We observe a
striking di®erence between small and big ¯rms across all divisions. The local factor risk premium is
consistently negative and strongly signi¯cant for small ¯rms. In terms of average cross-section R
2 the
model performs slightly better than the Fama-French 3-factor model. Moreover, except for the West North
Central division, the di®erences in size for the local risk premium across divisions become negligible: once
we concentrate on small ¯rms, di®erences in population density look much less relevant. In contrast, for
large ¯rms, the risk premia for the local risk factors becomes statistically insigni¯cant for all the divisions.
For large ¯rms, the average cross-section R
2 is similar to that of the CAPM and much lower than that of
the Fama-French three factor model. Therefore, our model seems to be capturing a distinctive risk factor
for small ¯rms beyond the pure market capitalization argument in Fama-French.
Another ¯rm characteristic, which is also likely to be associated with locality, is a ¯rm's book to market
ratio. We separate the twenty book to market-sorted portfolios into two groups: portfolios between high
(value ¯rms) and low (growth ¯rms) book to market. Once again, the di®erences between the two groups
are quite remarkable. Across all divisions growth ¯rms exhibit a negative and statistically signi¯cant risk
premium for the local risk factor in all but one division. The cross sectional R
2 for our model is three
times higher than that of the Fama-French model. In fact, the Fama-French model performs no better
than the CAPM in terms of pricing the growth stock portfolios. When we look at the value ¯rms, none
2We include as an appendix (Figure 2) the latest Census map of population density published in 2000.
2of the divisional risk premia are statistically signi¯cant. Hence, the local risk factors in our model are
strongly supported by growth ¯rms while they look irrelevant in pricing value stocks.
We undertake a number of robustness checks. First, we focus the tests on the four divisions with the
lowest level of population density and ¯nd that the results are even stronger than when considering all
divisions. These ¯ndings suggests that in low population density areas it is easier to observe the reference
group and hence keeping up with the Joneses preferences have a stronger impact on asset prices. Second,
we focus on the ¯ve smallest and ¯ve lowest book to market portfolios under the assumption that the
smaller the ¯rms and the lower the book to market ratio the more local the ¯rms are. The empirical
tests on these data sets show that the model performs even better than when using all stocks or the 10
smallest and 10 lowest book to market portfolios.
The paper is organized as follows. The related literature is discussed in section 2. We introduce the
model and derive its testable implications in section 3. Section 4 presents the data and the main empirical
results. Section 5 o®ers some conclusions.
2 Related literature
To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper to test the cross-section implication of relative wealth concerns for
stock returns at the domestic level. Other papers have studied the theoretical asset pricing implications
of relative wealth concerns: G¶ omez (2007) for the case of EHF and DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2006)
for the case of price-driven wealth concerns. G¶ omez, Priestley and Zapatero (2007) test the cross-section
performance of an international model with \Keeping up with the Joneses" preferences and restricted
market participation of some agents. Keeping up with the Joneses preferences were introduced by Abel
(1990) and further studied by Gal¶ ³ (1994). Evidence of this type of preferences is presented in Ravina
(2005).
Our paper is closely related to the literature on portfolio under-diversi¯cation. Theory predicts that,
in a frictionless model with full market participation and complete ¯nancial markets, investors should
hold the same well-diversi¯ed portfolio. This prediction was ¯rst refuted at the international level by
the seminal paper of French and Poterba (1991). This is known as the \home bias puzzle" and refers to
the ¯nding that investors over-invest in domestic stocks relative to the optimal global risk-diversi¯cation
level.3
More recently, several papers have documented that this lack of diversi¯cation is also present at the
domestic level within the US. This phenomenon has been dubbed the \home bias at home puzzle." Coval
and Moskowitz (1999), for instance, study the investment behavior of money managers and observe that in
their investments they favor (with respect to what would be optimal) local ¯rms. Huberman (2001) uses
the fact that individuals prefer to invest in their local Bell company to the other divisional Bell companies
to argue that it is \familiarity" what drives this bias. Shore and White (2002) propose external habit
formation as an explanation for the puzzle. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) show that households exhibit
a strong preference for local investments. Their empirical tests seem to suggest that investors exploit
local information to obtain higher returns.
3For a literature review of this puzzle and the proposed explanations see Lewis (1999).
3Our model, as well as the model in DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004), derives partial equilibrium
implications for portfolio holdings. Testing those predictions, however, would require to estimate expected
returns, volatilities and risk-aversion. Those estimates have been shown to results in implausible portfolio
holdings in a one-period, mean-variance setting like ours.4 We overcome these problems by concentrating
on the cross-section predictions of the model. Our results are consistent with the home bias at home
literature: local risk factors command a negative risk premia and hence o®er a hedging function to local
investors.
The ¯ndings regarding the value and growth stocks are consistent with the well documented value
premium puzzle (see, for example, Berk et al (1999), Cooper (2006), Zhang (2006), Xing (2007)), by
which the risk-adjusted expected return of growth ¯rms are smaller than that of value ¯rms. Our analysis
supports the idea that the value premium puzzle is the result of portfolio externalities. A possible
explanation is the fact that ¯rms with low book-to-market ratio also display high investment in R&D;
see, for example, Lev (1999) and Hansen, Heaton and Li (2004). By de¯nition, the investment in R&D
is highly intensive in human capital, which results in the type of non-diversi¯able wealth against which
investors will want to hedge by holding the security (a growth stock) and accepting the resulting negative
risk premium.
Zenger (1994) o®ers an alternative explanation by presenting a model of diseconomies of scale in R&D:
smaller ¯rms are more e±cient in overcoming the agency problem of hidden information and hidden
behavior in R&D. His empirical tests seem to support the model's prediction: small growth ¯rms attract
and retain engineers with higher ability and skill (human capital). Our asset pricing results corroborate
this intuition.
3 The model
Let us assume a one-period economy. Agents in this economy live in a two-division country: they either
live in the north, n, or the south, s. There exists a ¯rm that produces a global good, tradable across
divisions. Consumption is expressed in terms of this global good and takes place at the end of the period,
t = 1.
In each division, there are two types of agents: \investors" and \workers." At time t = 0, investors
are endowed with shares of the ¯rm that produces the global good. Call c0
k the aggregate value of those
shares at the beginning of the period for agents in division k. For simplicity, let c0
k = 1 in both divisions.
At the beginning of the period, workers in each division are endowed with human capital that produces a
¯xed number ¹ wk of units of the local good at time t = 1. Workers face incomplete markets because they
cannot trade their human capital (due to moral hazard and short-selling constraints) and have no access
to ¯nancial markets; therefore, they cannot hedge their income risk.
Agents' utility over consumption for the two goods is given by:5
4See, for instance, Michaud (1989). Brandt (2004) surveys the literature.
5We use the single-parameter, CRRA utility function. It can be shown that the model yields the same predictions for the
cross-section of stock returns if this utility function is replaced by the two-parameter, CES utility function in section IV.B





The parameter ± > 0 speci¯es the relative importance of the local good. In equilibrium, the relative price





. As it would be expected,
the scarcer the (¯xed) local good endowment relative to the (stochastic) global good consumption, the
higher the relative price of the former.
In addition to the ¯rm's shares there are as many zero net supply stocks as needed for ¯nancial markets
to be complete. Let r denote the shares excess return and F(r) the distribution function. The bond (in
zero net supply) has gross return R. Proposition 2 in DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004) shows that











denote the relative price at t = 0 of one unit of the non-diversi¯able, local good
endowment of workers at time t = 1. Recall that we normalized the initial investor's shares endowment
c0 = 1. Hence, p0 = ± ¹ w¡®. The present value of the workers endowment is therefore ¹ w0 = ± ¹ w1¡®.
The relative wealth at t = 0 of the workers in division k as a proportion of the total country wealth is
given by µk = ¹ w0
1+ ¹ w0. Call ¹ wp= ¹ w0 the return on the workers wealth (in units of the global good) over the
period. Under complete (¯nancial) markets, there exists a portfolio Xw such that
¹ wp
¹ w0 = R + r0Xw. After




k + ¿k ­¡1E(r); (2)
where the parameters bk =
®k¡1
®k and ¿k = 1=®k represent the portfolio bias and the risk-tolerance coe±-
cient, respectively. Notice that the optimal portfolio for the logarithmic investor (® = 1) coincides with
the benchmark, well diversi¯ed portfolio ­¡1E(r). No relative wealth concern arises even in the presence






where c denotes the investor's consumption; C is the division average or per capita consumption; ® > 0
is the (constant) relative risk-aversion coe±cient and 1 > ° ¸ 0 is the \Joneses parameter." For ° > 0,
the constant average consumption elasticity of marginal utility (around the symmetric equilibrium), ®°,
is positive as well: increasing the average consumption per capita C makes the individual's marginal
consumption more valuable since it helps her to \keep up with the Joneses." In short, we assume the
6Note that we can approximate uc(c;p) around the initial endowment/price (c
0;p





0x + R ¡ 1) +
¹ w0
1+ ¹ w0(® ¡ 1)
¡ ¹ wp




¹ w0 = R+r
0X
w in the equation. After multiplying for
r and taking expectations we obtain the investors ¯rst order condition for the optimal portfolio. The linear approximation
for the optimal portfolio follows after solving for x
¤ and taking into account that E(r
0r) ¼ ­ and that E(r)(R ¡ 1) ¼ 0 for
small values of E(r) and the (net) risk free rate, R ¡ 1.
5division's average consumption to be a positive consumption externality. By imposing ° < 1 we ensure a
positive risk-aversion coe±cient for the representative investor.7
G¶ omez, Priestley and Zapatero (2007) show that the problem's ¯rst order condition can be written as
a function of the investor's consumption and the workers relative wealth, ¹ w=c:
E
³
rc¡®(1¡°)(1 + ¹ w=c)®°
´
= 0:
Notice that, in the absence of keeping up with the Joneses behavior (° = 0), the previous condition
reduces to E (rc¡®) = 0, the standard CRRA Euler equation.
Since ¯nancial markets are complete, there exists a mimicking portfolio Xw that maps the workers
relative income onto the investment opportunity set such that ¹ w=c = ¹ w0(R + r0Xw). Following the same
approximation as before, G¶ omez, Priestley and Zapatero (2007) show that the investor's optimal portfolio
coincides with equation (2) where bk =
°k
1¡°k and ¿k = 1
®k(1¡°k).
Let µk > 0 for k = fn;sg. We regress the workers non-diversi¯able wealth return, rw
k = r0Xw, onto
the market portfolio return plus a constant:8
rw
k = ak + ¯k rM + »k: (3)
Portfolio ¯k xM represents the projection of the workers income onto the security market line spanned
by the market portfolio xM. De¯ne the portfolio Fk ´ Xw
k ¡ ¯k xM as a \residual" factor portfolio with
return rF
k = r0Fk. De¯ne the matrix F of dimension N £ 3 as the column juxtaposition of the market
portfolio and the orthogonal portfolios, F ´ (xM;Fn;Fs).
Given equations (2) and (3), G¶ omez, Priestley and Zapatero (2007) show that, in equilibrium,
E(r) = ¯ ¸; (4)
where ¯ = ­F (F 0­F)¡1 denotes the 2£3 (in general N £(1+K), with N the number of assets and K
the number of divisions) matrix of betas, with the ¯rst column as the market betas for both assets. The
model has testable implications for the risk premia (¸) and betas (¯).


























7Notice that, by rewriting ° = (® ¡ 1)=®, ® ¸ 1, the representative investor's utility function becomes the standard






with average consumption elasticity of marginal utility (® ¡ 1). Our formulation is more convenient for the empirical tests
of the model.
8See the Appendix in G¶ omez, Priestley and Zapatero (2007) for an analysis of the e®ect of the orthogonalization on the
prices of risk and the betas of our estimation.
6with H the aggregate risk-aversion coe±cient. The country market portfolio, xM, is partially correlated
with each division's non-diversi¯able risk. That correlation is captured by the coe±cient ¯k. That
correlation o®ers partial hedging against deviations from the local, non-tradable risk (in case µb > 0).
The parenthesis in equation (5) captures the net price of risk on the country-wide risk factor, after
discounting the (capitalization weighted) hedging e®ect. If the weighted value of the betas is higher than
the market beta (i.e., 1), the model predicts that the market price of risk could turn negative. Intuitively, if
the hedging properties of the market portfolio against local risk outweigh the compensation for systematic
risk the net expected market price of risk becomes negative.
Furthermore, if there is a relative wealth concern (b > 0) in the economy and workers income is
not diversi¯able (µ > 0), there should be two additional risk factors together with the market risk factor.
Regarding their sign, the model predicts that if cov(rF
n ;rF
s ) > 0, then ¸n and ¸s will be negative. To under-
stand this result, suppose for the moment that the zero-beta portfolios were orthogonal (Cov(rF
n ;rF
s ) = 0).
Then, the price of risk would be easily isolated and strictly negative. The intuition for the negative sign
would be as follows: An asset that has positive covariance with portfolio Fk will hedge the investor in
division k from the local, non-diversi¯able income risk. This investor will be willing to pay a higher price
for that asset thus yielding a lower return. In equilibrium, the price of risk for Fk would be, in absolute
terms, increasing in bk and the volatility of the hedge portfolio. If the covariance between both zero-beta
portfolios is positive, this just increases the absolute value of the negative prices of risk for every division's
hedge portfolio.
With respect to the betas, for a given asset i 2 1;2;::;N, the model predicts three betas: the standard

























with D = Var(rF
n )Var(rF
s ) ¡ Cov2(rF
n ;rF
s ) > 0.
To understand the model's prediction in terms of these betas, assume ¯rst that both zero-beta port-
folios are pairwise orthogonal, Cov(rF
n ;rF
s ) = 0. In this case, an asset positively correlated with division
n non-diversi¯able local risk (Cov(ri;rF
n ) > 0) and with no, or negative, correlation with division s non-
diversi¯able local risk (Cov(ri;rF
s ) · 0) will have ¯n
i > 0 and ¯s
i · 0 (the symmetric result follows for an
asset i with Cov(ri;rF
n ) · 0 and Cov(ri;rF
s ) > 0). Notice that if Cov(rF
n ;rF
s ) > 0 the second term in the
computation of the ¯rst beta is negative, and the second term in the computation of the second beta is
positive, which (along with the minus sign in front of the second terms), goes in the same direction as
our previous conclusion about the signs of the betas.
The sign of these betas together with that of the expected price of risk on the orthogonal portfolios in
(5) explains the equilibrium expected returns in our model. Besides the market risk premium, investors
require a premium for holding stocks with no, or negative, correlation with the non-hedgeable local labor
or entrepreneurial income. In addition, investors are willing to give up expected returns (that is, pay
a premium) for the stocks that are correlated with the idiosyncratic component of the local risk and,
therefore, help them to hedge against that risk. This result depends in a fundamental way on the market
friction that prevents some agents from participating in the markets.
7We name the model presented in this paper KEEPM, which stands for \KEEping up Pricing Model."
The rest of the paper deals with testing the asset pricing implications of the model.
4 Empirical Results
We consider all ¯rms in the COMPUSTAT/CRSP data base. Using the information on headquarters
location in COMPUSTAT, each ¯rm is assigned into one of the nine Census Bureau Divisions. We index
the divisions with two capital letters: WS is West South Central, PA is Paci¯c, ES is East South Central,
MO is Mountain, EN is East North Central, SA is South Atlantic, WN is West North Central, MA is
Middle Atlantic, and NE is New England. For each division we sort stocks into two sets of portfolios. The
¯rst set sort stocks into twenty portfolios in year t according to market capitalization at the end of year
t ¡ 1: The second set sorts stocks into twenty portfolio in year t according to the ¯rms book to market
ratio using accounting information on book values from year t¡1 and market value from the end of year
t ¡ 1: We calculate excess returns by subtracting the one month t-bill rate from the actual returns.
The proxy for local non-diversi¯able wealth that we use is quarterly state level personal income which
is aggregated to the divisional level. The source of this data is the divisional Economic Information
System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. We calculate the growth rate in
personal income at the divisional level as the proxy for non-diversi¯able wealth. Because the personal
income data is at a quarterly frequency all the data are sampled quarterly from the second quarter of 1979
to the ¯nal quarter of 2002. In addition to the local risk factors we also require the excess return on the
aggregate stock market portfolio. We compare the performance of our model to that of the Fama-French
three factor model that uses the excess return on aggregate stock market portfolio, the small minus big
(smb) portfolio and the high minus low (hml) book to market portfolio. The premia on the smb and hml
are 0.23 and 1.17 per cent per quarter respectively.
The asset pricing implications of the model state that local, divisional risk factors that proxy for
orthogonal local wealth should be priced in the cross-section of stock returns with a negative risk premium.
In order to test this proposition the model can be consistently estimated by the cross-sectional methods
due to Fama and MacBeth (1973). Given that there are nine divisions this implies that the expected







where E(ri;t) is the expected return on asset i; ¸M is the market price of risk, ¯M
i is the market beta of
stock i; ¸d is the price of risk associated with orthogonal local personal income in division d; and ¯d
i is
the beta of stock i to the measure of orthogonal local personal income in division d: The model predicts
that ¸d < 0:
The ¯rst assessment of the KEEPM's performance is to consider whether the division risk factors are
negative and statistically signi¯cant. In addition, we appraise the performance of the model by considering
the ability of the model to explain the cross-sectional variation in the test assets. To accomplish this we
report the R2 of the cross-sectional regression which calculates the amount of cross sectional variation
8that is captured by the model. Following Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001) we calculate the R2 as [V arc(ri) ¡ V arc(ei)]=V arc(ri) where V arc is the cross-sectional variance,
ri is the average return and ei is the average residual: Due to the large number of risk factors, we report
the adjusted R2;R
2: Whilst the R
2 indicates the general ¯t of the model it is not a direct test of the
model. An appropriate test of the model is to examine whether the models' pricing errors are zero. It is
also useful to consider the performance of the model relative to existing models that pertain to describe
the cross section of stock returns. To this end we estimate the CAPM and the Fama-French three factor
model.
The Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure involves a ¯rst step in which time series regressions are
used to estimate the betas, and a second step in which cross-sectional regressions are used to estimate the
lambdas. When data is available over a long sample period it is usual to undertake a rolling regression
approach of using sixty observations up to time t in the ¯rst step to obtain the ¯rst beta. This beta
is then used in the second step to estimate a cross-sectional regression of average returns at time t + 1
on the beta estimated up until time t: The data is then rolled forward one month and the procedure is
repeated. This results in a time-series of cross section estimates of the market price of risk. However,
this rolling procedure is not appropriate when using quarterly the time series data over a relatively short
sample. Rather, the beta coe±cients are estimated over the entire sample and used in all of the T cross-
sectional regressions. Estimating a single beta over the sample period when employing quarterly data is
also employed in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and this methodology is discussed in Cochrane (2001).
Table 1, panel A reports estimates of model using twenty size sorted portfolios from each of the nine
divisions. All of the prices of risk associated with the nine divisions are estimated to be negative and
all are statistically signi¯cant. This o®ers strong support for the theory that local risk is important,
whether this is driven by keeping up with the Joneses preferences or by local goods being in short supply.
Interestingly, the divisions that have the highest prices of risk (¸ 0:01) are West North Central, West
South Central, East South Central, and East North Central. These divisions and the states within them
are characterized by low population density. Panel B reports an F-test of the restriction that the prices
of risk on the high population density divisions are the same as the average price of risk across the low
density divisions (-0.0117). In every case we reject the null hypothesis of equal prices of risk in favour of
the alternative that the prices of risk in the low population density are larger (absolutely).
The result regarding population density are consistent with the ¯ndings in Hong, Kubik and Stein
(2008) who show that the prices of shares in census divisions with high population density have higher
prices than shares in low population density divisions. This explanation is similar to the premium argu-
ment in DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004) who argue that low population density is strongly associated
with low aggregate book value. A shortage of local ¯rms pushes their prices up driving returns down.
In the context of our model, lower density is probably associated with not only fewer ¯rms but, more
importantly, these ¯rms are likely to be more local. Investors are willing to pay a higher price for those
assets (in short supply) because they are positively correlated with the local, non-diversi¯able risk. The
aggregate stock market price of risk is positive and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. At least as far as
the signs and statistical signi¯cance of the prices of risk are concerned, the model has strong empirical
support. The R
2 is 50% which is reasonable for size sorted portfolios.
9The next two rows of table 1 report estimates from the CAPM and the Fama-French three factor
model. The market price of risk in the CAPM is positive and statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level.
However, according to the R
2 it can only explain 1% of the cross-sectional variation in the average excess
returns of the test assets. This inability of the CAPM to explain the cross section of stock returns is
a well known result. The Fama-French three factor model does considerably better than the CAPM in
terms of explaining the cross section of stock returns. All three prices of risk are statistically signi¯cant,
although the price of risk on the smb factor is negative. Recall from the discussion of the data above that
over the sample period that we consider the smb premium is very small. It is evident from the R
2 of the
Fama-French model, which is 52%, that the model that incorporates local non-diversi¯able divisional risk
does just as well at describing the cross-section of returns as the Fama-French model.
Presumably, we could get stronger tests of the model if we distinguish between stocks that we, a priori,
consider to be more sensitive to local risk factors. In the presence of portfolio externalities investors want
to buy stocks that hedge them against movements in the non-diversi¯able local wealth. Arguably, small
capitalization stocks are more highly correlated to local wealth/goods. It is well documented (see, for
instance, Brown and Medo® (1989) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998)) that smaller ¯rms pay, other
things equal, lower wages making them, in principle, less competitive in attracting workers from other
divisions. In contrast, large ¯rms, with more competitive salaries, are more likely to attract more mobile
workers. They are, at the same time, more likely to be diversi¯ed geographically, have subsidiaries in
other states and even abroad. In light of this, we would expect the model to price small stocks better
than large stocks.
Table 2 reports results from estimation of the model (along with the CAPM and the Fama-French
model) using the 10 smallest portfolio from each of the nine divisions (Panel A) and the 10 largest
portfolios from each of the nine divisions (Panel B). Regarding the small stocks on panel A, all the prices
of risk are negative and statistically signi¯cant and the R
2 is 50%. For these small stocks the CAPM does
slightly better than when including all stocks, recording a R
2 of 7%. When considering just the small
stocks the Fama-French model does slightly worse that the local model with a R
2 of 48%, although all
three risk factors in the Fama-French model are statistically signi¯cant and have positive signs.
The results from the small stock portfolios become striking when compared to those in panel B that
use the remaining 10 portfolios which we call the large ¯rms. In this case only two of the prices of risk on
the local factors are negative and only one of these is statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level (West South
Central). The R
2 falls by half to 25% and, moreover, for these large stocks, the R
2 from the CAPM is
18%, so including the local factors does very little to improve the R
2 relative to that of the CAPM. In
sharp contrast, in panel A the R
2 rose from 7% in the CAPM to 50% in the local model. Note also that
the Fama-French model produces a R
2 of 46% and therefore does much better than the local model in
pricing the large stocks. This results is particularly supportive of the proposed model since we ¯nd strong
support for the model using data where we a priori expect stronger results and no support for the model
when using data where we do not expect the model to work. Note that for the large stocks the premium
on the smb factor becomes negative.
Firm size is not the only characteristic that might help to di®erentiate local from more diversi¯ed
¯rms. The book-to-market of a ¯rm might also work given that ¯rms with a low book-to-market are
10growth ¯rms that tend to be younger and might have more human capital speci¯c factors, or unique
technology that is speci¯c to a particular geographical area (like Silicon Valley in California). In contrast,
¯rms with a high book-to-market ratio are value ¯rms and are more likely to diversi¯ed geographically
with production and sales across divisions and internationally. Another explanation is the fact that ¯rms
with a low book-to-market ratio also display high investment in R&D (see, for example, Lev (1999) and
Hansen, Heaton and Li (2004)). By de¯nition, the investment in R&D is highly intensive in human
capital, which results in the type of non-diversi¯able wealth against which investors will want to hedge
by holding the security (a growth stock).
For each division we also sort stocks into twenty book-to-market portfolios. Panel A of table 3 reports
the parameter estimates from the three models using all twenty portfolios. As was the case for the size
sorted portfolios, each of the local risk factors command a negative price of risk and each one is statistically
signi¯cant. The market price of risk is positive and statistically signi¯cant and the R
2 is 25% which is
half the size of the R
2 when using size portfolios. However, the R
2 from the Fama-French model is also
25% , which is about half of that of the R
2 when using size portfolios. The CAPM, which records an R
2
of 10%, does much better in terms of describing the cross sectional patterns of book to market portfolio
than size portfolios.
Panel B presents results using 10 portfolios with the lowest book-to-market in each division. As
expected, the local model does well in explaining the cross-section of these low book-to-market portfolios.
All of the local prices of risk are negative and all by one (New England) are statistically signi¯cant. The
R
2 is 35%, somewhat higher than when including all of the book-to-market portfolios. Estimation of the
CAPM results in a negative market price of risk and a R
2 of 10%. The Fama-French model o®ers little
improvement over and above that of the CAPM with a R
2 of 11% which is considerably smaller than for
the Fama-French model with all stocks and the local model. Considering all of the three models, the local
model provides a clear advantage in pricing low book-to-market portfolios, even when compared to the
Fama-French model.
Now turning to the 10 high book-to-market portfolios for each division, panel C shows that seven of
the nine local risk factors have a negative sign but only one of them (West South Central) is marginally
statistically signi¯cant. Interestingly, given the lack of statistical signi¯cance of the local risk factors,
the R
2 is 55%. However, this is explained when considering the CAPM in the next row of the panel
which produces a positive market price of risk and a R
2 of 43%. Thus, much of the good performance
of the local model comes from the role of the market price of risk. In fact, this is a surprising results
given the poor performance of the CAPM in general when considering size portfolios and the results using
all the book to market portfolios. The ¯nal row of the panel reports the results from the estimation of
the Fama-French model. There is little improvement in this model relative to the CAPM. Therefore, at
least as far as stocks with high book to market ratios are concerned, the CAPM does a reasonable job at
explaining the cross-section of stock returns.
The discussion thus far has focussed on the sign and statistical signi¯cance of the prices of risk and
the R
2 in order to assess the performance of the models. In table 4 we report the square root of the
average absolute pricing errors of the model along with standard errors in parentheses. Each column of
the table reports a particular model and each row a division. Columns 2 through to 4 report the pricing
11errors for model reported in table 1 that uses all twenty of the size portfolios from each division. The row
called All reports the pricing errors across all 180 portfolios, the other rows report the pricing errors for
each division. The local model and the Fama-French model have similar pricing errors which are much
lower than the pricing errors from the CAPM. All three models do poorly in terms of having large pricing
errors in the Paci¯c division. The Mountain division also have a high pricing error for the local model.
Otherwise for the remaining divisions the pricing errors are similar to the results for all divisions.
Columns ¯ve through to seven report the pricing errors for the 10 small stock portfolios in each
division. The pricing errors for the small stock portfolios follow a similar patter to those for all of the
portfolio in the previous three columns. The local model has slightly smaller pricing errors than the
Fama-French three factor model. Both of these models have substantially smaller pricing errors than the
CAPM. Turning next to the large size portfolios in the ¯nal three columns of the table, the Fama-French
model has the smallest pricing error but it is very close to the local model (0.006 as opposed to 0.007).
Interestingly, the pricing errors of the CAPM are much smaller for the large size portfolios. The patterns
in the pricing errors match those of the R
2 in that the CAPM appears to perform better for large stocks.
The pricing errors associated with the book-to-market portfolios are reported in table 5. The CAPM
has slightly higher pricing errors when considering all the book-to-market portfolios relative to the local
model and Fama-French model. The local model and the Fama-French model also have slightly smaller
pricing errors when considering only the low book-to-market portfolios. Finally, when considering the
high book to market portfolios the local model has a slightly lower pricing error, but it is very similar to
the CAPM and the Fama-French model.
4.1 Robustness Tests
In Table 6 we undertake some robustness tests. We argued earlier that the divisions that had the highest
estimated price of risk were in divisions that had low population density. To assess this further we re-
estimate the model using the 10 small stock portfolio in the four regions with low population density.
These are West South Central, East South Central, East North Central and West North Central. Panel
A reports the results and shows that when we consider only these divisions the R
2 59%, nearly 20%
larger than when including the 10 small stock portfolio in all divisions. There is also an increase in the
estimated prices of risk and their statistical signi¯cance is somewhat higher. These ¯ndings add weight to
our earlier argument that population density is an important determinant of the cross-section of expected
returns. In our model this is most likely working through the observation that in low population density
areas it is easier to observe the reference group and hence keeping up with the Joneses preferences have
a stronger impact on asset prices
Panels B of Table 6 considers a further robustness checks based on ¯rm size. Under the assumption
that the smaller the stocks the more local the ¯rms are, we would expect to ¯nd stronger evidence in
favour of the model if we were to look at the smallest ¯rms in isolation. Therefore, in Panel B we split
the small stock portfolios further and consider the ¯ve smallest stock portfolios in each division. All the
prices of risk are negative and statistically signi¯cant. In this case the R
2 increases to 54%, a modest
increase of just under 10%.
125 Conclusion
Relative wealth concerns can lead to an equilibrium in which securities that load on a local non-diversi¯able
risk factor have a negative risk premium. We perform this analysis for portfolios of securities for the nine
US census divisions. We ¯nd strong empirical support for our conjecture. Especially, for small and growth
¯rms. In addition, our results seem to be related to the ¯nding of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008), who
show that population density helps explaining the cross-section of stock returns. A possible explanation
is that relative wealth concerns are stronger in areas with low population density because, for example,
it is easier to identify the reference group (the \Joneses") with respect to which each particular investor
has relative wealth concerns.
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15Table 1
Size Sorted Portfolios
This table reports results from estimating cross-sectional regressions of average excess
returns on the nine divisional betas and market beta. We use returns on twenty size portfolio
for each of the nine divisions. ¸i is the estimated price of risk for division i: The divisions
are indexed with two capital letters: WS is West South Central, PA is Paci¯c, ES is East
South Central, MO is Mountain, EN is East North Central, SA is South Atlantic, WN is West
North Central, MA is Middle Atlantic, and NE is New England. ¸m is the market price of
risk, ¸smb is the price of risk associated with the small minus big factor, ¸hml is the price of
risk associated with the high minus low book to market factor. Data are sampled 1979Q2 to
2002Q4. Numbers in parentheses are t{statistics. R
2 is the adjusted R2:
Panel A: Estimates

































Panel B: Testing Restrictions












Small and Large Size Portfolios
This table reports results from estimating cross-sectional regressions of average excess
returns on the nine divisional betas and market beta. Panel A reports results using the
returns on the 10 smallest size portfolios. Panel B reports results using the returns on the 10
largest portfolios. ¸i is the estimated price of risk for division i: The divisions are indexed with
two capital letters: WS is West South Central, PA is Paci¯c, ES is East South Central, MO is
Mountain, EN is East North Central, SA is South Atlantic, WN is West North Central, MA
is Middle Atlantic, and NE is New England. ¸m is the market price of risk, ¸smb is the price
of risk associated with the small minus big factor, ¸hml is the price of risk associated with
the high minus low book to market factor. Data are sampled 1979Q2 to 2002Q4. Numbers in
parentheses are t{statistics. R
2 is the adjusted R2:
Panel A: Small Stock Portfolios

































Panel B: Large Stock Portfolios



































This table reports results from estimating cross-sectional regressions of average excess
returns on the nine divisional betas and market beta. Panel A reports results from using
twenty portfolio ranked by the ¯rm's book to market ratio. Panel B reports results using the
returns on the 10 portfolios with the lowest book to market ratio. Panel C reports results using
the returns on the 10 portfolios with the highest book to market ratio. ¸i is the estimated
price of risk for division i: The divisions are indexed with two capital letters: WS is West
South Central, PA is Paci¯c, ES is East South Central, MO is Mountain, EN is East North
Central, SA is South Atlantic, WN is West North Central, MA is Middle Atlantic, and NE
is New England. ¸m is the market price of risk, ¸smb is the price of risk associated with the
small minus big factor, ¸hml is the price of risk associated with the high minus low book to
market factor. Data are sampled 1979Q2 to 2002Q4. Numbers in parentheses are t{statistics.
R
2 is the adjusted R2:
Panel A: All Portfolios
































Panel B: Low Book-to-Market Portfolios

































Panel C: High Book-to-Market Portfolios


































Pricing Errors Size Portfolios
This table reports analysis of pricing errors. KEEPM is the Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses
model, CAPM is the CAPM, FF is the Fama and French model. All includes size sorted
portfolios from all 9 divisions. We report the square root of the average squared pricing error
for all divisions aggregated together and for the 20 portfolios in each division. The divisions
are indexed with two capital letters: WS is West South Central, PA is Paci¯c, ES is East
South Central, MO is Mountain, EN is East North Central, SA is South Atlantic, WN is West
North Central, MA is Middle Atlantic, and NE is New England. Standard errors are reported
in parenthesis. Data are sampled 1979Q2 to 2002Q4.
Size All Size Small Size Large






















































































































































































Pricing Errors Book-to-Market Portfolios
This table reports analysis of pricing errors. KEEPM is the Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses
model, CAPM is the CAPM, FF is the Fama and French model. All includes book to market
sorted portfolios from all 9 divisions. We report the square root of the average squared pricing
error for all divisions aggregated together and for the 20 portfolios in each division. The
divisions are indexed with two capital letters: WS is West South Central, PA is Paci¯c, ES is
East South Central, MO is Mountain, EN is East North Central, SA is South Atlantic, WN
is West North Central, MA is Middle Atlantic, and NE is New England. Standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. Data are sampled 1979Q2 to 2002Q4.
BM All BM Low BM High























































































































































































This table reports results in Panel using the ¯ve smallest size portfolios in each region.
Panel reports results using the ¯ve portfolios with the lowest book to market ratio. Panel
C reports results using the 10 small stock portfolios for divisions with the lowest population
densities. ¸i is the estimated price of risk for division i: The divisions are indexed with two
capital letters: WS is West South Central, PA is Paci¯c, ES is East South Central, MO is
Mountain, EN is East North Central, SA is South Atlantic, WN is West North Central, MA
is Middle Atlantic, and NE is New England. ¸m is the market price of risk. Data are sampled
1979Q2 to 2002Q4. Numbers in parentheses are t{statistics. R
2 is the adjusted R2:
Panel A: Small Stocks, Low Population Density Divisions























Panel B:Very Small Stock Portfolios













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Map of US Census regions and divisions.Figure 2: Map of population density by state, according to the last Census (2000).NOTAS NOTAS  
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